Blog | Trinity Cyber

Two Interpreters, One Goal: How Bring Your Own Interpreter Loaders Deliver Formbook

Written by Cramer Snuggs | Nov 18, 2026, 3:00:01 PM

Attackers don’t need to rely on pre-installed software to attack a victim’s computer if they can bring their own. In this blog, Trinity Cyber researchers analyze a Formbook information stealer campaign that uses this approach, known as Bring-your-own-Interpreter (BYOI), to deliver malware using malicious scripts run by legitimate AutoIt and LuaJIT software.

The two loaders took different paths to the same goal: execute Donut-generated shellcode and deliver Formbook, also known as XLoader. Both paired a legitimate runtime with a malicious script, adding layers that can hinder analysis and detection.

Our technical brief provides comprehensive analysis of the campaign. 

Overview of Formbook's Layered Delivery Scheme 

 

The AutoIT Delivery Chain

The first chain began with a phishing email carrying a ZIP attachment. Inside was an obfuscated VBScript file that decoded a compressed PowerShell script, wrote it temporarily to disk, and executed it. A further PowerShell layer decoded and ran another embedded script.

The final PowerShell stage decrypted and wrote three components to disk: a legitimate AutoIt interpreter, an obfuscated AutoIt loader script, and Donut-generated shellcode that remained encrypted under a second layer. It then launched the interpreter with the malicious script as an argument.

The AutoIt loader decrypted the shellcode in memory, started the Windows iexpress.exe utility, and injected the payload into that process. The Donut payload ultimately delivered Formbook.

The LuaJIT Delivery Chain

The second loader began with a batch script delivered in a RAR phishing attachment. The batch script used a temporary VBScript to relaunch itself with the h1dd3n argument, then decoded two embedded payloads: a LuaJIT interpreter and an obfuscated Lua script.

After checking for antivirus software, the batch script launched LuaJIT to run the malicious script. The Lua loader used several techniques intended to frustrate analysis and security monitoring, including obfuscated code, anti-debugging checks, DLL unhooking, and patching of ETW and AMSI functions within its process.

Finally, the Lua script decoded Donut-generated shellcode and executed it in memory. As in the AutoIt chain, the Donut payload delivered Formbook.

Why the Layers Matter

The interpreters in these attacks are legitimate software. Their malicious role becomes clear in the context of the surrounding scripts, encoded payloads, and execution chain. By bundling the runtimes, attackers can run their scripts without depending on an interpreter already being installed, while adding layers for defenders to inspect.

The campaign illustrates a broader defensive challenge: the content that reaches a device can conceal what runs later. Compression, encoding, encryption, and legitimate executables can separate the initial attachment from the final payload, making the full chain harder to recognize.

Preventing Formbook with Full Content Inspection

Trinity Cyber customers are protected from these campaigns through Full Content Inspection (FCI). By inspecting and de-obfuscating content in files and network sessions, FCI identifies and removes malicious content inline, interrupting delivery before the loader reaches the endpoint.

Understanding the content and techniques behind these campaigns elevates Trinity Cyber’s coverage of this campaign beyond a filename, a familiar executable, or a single indicator – protecting against future Formbook delivery automatically.

Formbook is one of several threats Trinity Cyber stops before it reaches you. To learn how we can protect you from Formbook and other emerging threats, book a live demo today.